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of the company as an association of members, the modern
doctrinal basis of the allocation of powers rests on a quite different
conceptualisation of the company as a reified institution. In the
absence of a fundamental reform, therefore, the law cannot hope to
reconcile these conflicting rules in a principled way.
ROSS GRANTHAM
STATUTORY TRUSTS AND INSOLVENCY
IT is well settled that a statutory trust over a company’s property is
brought into existence when the court makes a winding-up order
(see Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v. C & K Construction Ltd. [1976]
A.C. 167). However, the relationship between the debt owed by the
company to a creditor and that creditor’s interest under the
statutory trust has rarely been considered in any depth. Wight v.
Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] UKPC 37, [2003] 3 W.L.R. 414
provides important guidance in this regard.
Wight v. Eckhardt Marine GmbH concerned a claim by
Eckhardt against the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(Overseas) Ltd. (‘‘BCCI(O)’’) under a guarantee, governed by the
law of Bangladesh, issued by a branch office of BCCI(O) in
Bangladesh shortly before the collapse of the BCCI group in July
1991. As BCCI(O) was incorporated in the Cayman Islands, a
winding-up petition was presented there in July 1991 and, in
January 1992, a winding-up order was made. In due course, the
appellants were appointed as liquidators of BCCI(O). In May 1992,
Eckhardt entered a proof of debt in the winding up. The
liquidators initially indicated that they would accept Eckhardt’s
proof. However, in August 1992, the Bangladeshi Government put
in place a scheme for the reconstruction of the branch of BCCI(O)
in Bangladesh. The scheme created a new entity, called the
‘‘Eastern Bank’’, which took over all the assets of BCCI(O)’s
branch in Bangladesh. The scheme also discharged the liabilities of
BCCI(O) in Bangladesh and created corresponding obligations on
the part of the Eastern Bank. In December 1995, the liquidators
rejected Eckhardt’s proof of debt because of the apparent discharge
of BCCI(O)’s liability according to Bangladeshi law. Eckhardt
protested, arguing that when the court made its winding-up order
(in January 1992) the original debt owed by BCCI(O) was replaced
by an interest under a statutory trust; and, as a consequence,
thereafter the law of Bangladesh became irrelevant, since it was not
the governing law of the trust.
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Lord Hoffmann, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council
(Lords Hoffmann, Nolan, Hobhouse of Woodborough, Scott of
Foscote and Walker of Gestingthorpe) rejected Eckhardt’s
contention. Whilst not doubting that the company became a trustee
of its assets for its creditors upon the making of the winding-up
order, Lord Hoffmann observed (para. [22]): ‘‘. . . their Lordships
do not understand how this can affect the question of who counts
as a creditor entitled to prove and receive a distribution under the
statutory trusts’’. In particular, although the making of a winding-
up order restricted creditors to a collective enforcement procedure,
it did not (para. [27]) ‘‘create new substantive rights in the creditors
or destroy the old ones’’. As Lord Hoffmann explained (para. [35]):
‘‘. . . the right to participate at any stage in the process of collective
enforcement by liquidation depends upon being a creditor. So that
when the debt was discharged under its proper law, it ceased to be
provable in the Cayman Islands liquidation and was properly
rejected’’.
The question whether a winding-up order creates ‘‘new
substantive rights’’ and destroys ‘‘the old ones’’ (above) was
considered in Re Cases of Taffs Well Ltd. [1992] Ch. 179, where
Judge Paul Baker Q.C. (sitting as a judge of the High Court) spoke
specifically of the acquisition of ‘‘new rights’’ (at 194), commenting
(at 191): ‘‘One may conclude that the effect of an order to wind up
is to convert the contractual rights of the creditors into proprietary
rights under a trust’’. Although Re Cases of Taffs Well Ltd. was not
cited before the Privy Council, there can be no doubt that such
comments, to the extent that they suggest that new substantive
rights are created, can no longer be regarded as good law.
The facts in Wight v. Eckhardt Marine GmbH, in particular the
combination of a local liquidation and the foreign restructuring of
a branch office, were unusual; nevertheless the general principle of
English law to be extracted from Lord Hoffmann’s judgment is that
a liquidator should not make a distribution to a person who, under
an applicable foreign law, has ceased to be a creditor by the time
the distribution is due to be made. A further question is whether
this principle may apply in a situation other than a discharge under
the applicable foreign law. For example, a company may go into
liquidation in England with certain debts governed by Japanese law
and, under Japanese law, there may be a limitation period that
expires a few months after the English court makes its winding-up
order. In this scenario it might be argued that, pursuant to the
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984, the English court must apply
the Japanese limitation period and therefore, by the time the
English liquidator is in a position to make any distribution, the
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Japanese ‘‘creditors’’ will have ceased to hold enforceable debts.
The answer appears to lie in section 1(3) of the 1984 Act. Section
1(1) of the 1984 Act requires the English court to give effect to a
foreign limitation period (where part of the applicable lex causae)
in relation to ‘‘any action or proceeding in a court in England’’.
Further, section 1(3) states that English law determines ‘‘whether,
and at what time, proceedings have been commenced’’ (emphasis
added). The presentation of a winding-up petition in England is
regarded as the commencement of an action for limitation purposes
(Re Karnos Property Co. Ltd. [1989] B.C.L.C. 340). Hence time will
cease to run when a winding-up petition is presented. (In relation
to non-petitioning creditors, see further Re Cases of Taffs Well Ltd.,
above.) Thus, in this commentator’s opinion, the expiration of a
foreign limitation period after the making of a winding-up order in
England can safely be ignored by an English liquidator.
In conclusion, the significance of Wight v. Eckhardt Marine
GmbH is twofold: the judgment provides an explanation of the
relationship between a creditor’s debt and the statutory trust arising
upon liquidation; and their Lordships have also stressed that the
right to participate in a distribution depends upon the retention of
the status of a creditor up to the time the liquidator makes the
distribution. The judgment does, however, leave some doubt as to
the circumstances in which such status may be lost.
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CHANGE OF POSITION IN INSOLVENCY
ROSE v. AIB Group [2003] EWHC 1737, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2791
involved an application by the liquidator of a construction
company, Tain, for a declaration of the invalidity of certain
payments under section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The
section renders void, subject to validation, all dispositions of
company property after the commencement of the winding up,
which is deemed to be when the petition was presented (Insolvency
Act 1986, section 129). Customs and Excise presented a winding up
petition on 4 February 1997. Payments in and out of the company’s
accounts continued, however, until 5 September 1997, when AIB
(‘‘the bank’’) became aware of the advertisement of the petition. By
that time the debts of £49,504 had been fully paid off. The sole
director of Tain, Mr. Bernard, had given a personal guarantee of
Tain’s overdraft, secured by a charge over his home. The bank
released that charge in January 1999. In 2001 the liquidator queried
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